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1. Introduction 
With the rising sophistication of modern democracies, 
the “business of governance [has become] more diffi-
cult” (Flinders, 2014, p. 3). Simultaneously, the “tech-
nocratization of political life” (Bickerton, 2012, p. 14) has 
increased the role of “experts” and their “ways of doing 
things” in processes of proposing, implementing and le-
gitimizing public policy (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; 
Joerges, 1999; Joerges, Ladeur, & Vos, 1997, p. 7; Ra-
daelli, 1999; Rayner, 2003, p. 163; Weingart, 1999). This 
trend towards increased reliance on external experts in 
the development and implementation of policy deci-
sions has thus far failed to receive attention in the vast 
literature on bureaucratic representation, which has fo-
cused exclusively on bureaucracies’ permanent and in-
ternal staff (Kennedy, 2014; Meier & Capers, 2013; 
Rhodes, Hart, & Noordegraaf, 2007). Yet, understanding 
the representativeness of external experts is important 
because such “knowledge agents have intrinsic govern-
ance capacities in their power to define problems…or 
engage in standard-setting, rule-making, or other regula-
tory activity” (Stone, 2012, p. 329). Hence, their discre-
tionary power may have important consequences for 
what premises are made available to decision-makers 
(Pennock, 1968). This study therefore contributes to 
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contemporary scholarship on representative bureaucra-
cy (RB) by explicitly turning attention to the representa-
tiveness of external and non-permanent experts in gov-
ernmental affairs.   
From a theoretical perspective, we argue that the in-
creased reliance on experts and external expertise in 
contemporary public policy-making requires a funda-
mental re-assessment of how the representativeness of 
the public sector workforce and its policy decisions is 
evaluated. This assertion rests on the fact that external 
experts are often recruited on time-limited contracts 
that only run as long as their specific expertise is re-
quired.1 Moreover, these contracts are often awarded 
outside the standard recruitment procedures. The im-
plied recruitment flexibility can generate either an im-
provement of passive (or descriptive) representation 
within the bureaucracy (when such contracts are em-
ployed to bolster staff contingents that are under-
represented in the permanent staff), or a deterioration 
of the bureaucracy’s representativeness (when experts 
with unfavourable characteristics tend to be excluded in 
favour of those with more desirable features). Such po-
tential shifts in passive representativeness may be im-
portant because they have the potential to translate into 
an active (under)representation of possibly relevant in-
terests and opinions (Kennedy, 2013; Schröter & von 
Maravić, 2014).2  
Following the advice of Kennedy (2014, p. 414), this 
study measures active representation by the repre-
sentative role perceptions evoked by office holders. 
More specifically, our focus is directed towards offi-
cials’ perception as “expert”. To the extent that gov-
ernment officials perceive themselves to be an “ex-
pert”, it is assumed that they would act according to an 
“epistemic logic” (see below). Officials would thus pre-
pare dossiers, argue and negotiate on the basis of their 
                                                          
1 The current trend towards “agencification” in (inter)national 
public-sector environments (Trondal, 2014) makes that bureau-
crats with very specific expertise often become employed on 
long-term contracts in very specialised agencies. Although such 
agencies raise interesting issues of representation and legitimacy 
in their own right and deserve more in-depth attention in future 
research, they fall outside the scope of our current analysis. This 
article deals exclusively with external experts. 
2 Although recent work on RB has often uncovered a link be-
tween passive and active representation (Meier, 1993; Atkins 
& Wilkins, 2013; Hindera, 1993), it is not required that a bu-
reaucracy is representative in a descriptive sense for it to 
take decisions that are representative in a substantive sense, 
or vice versa (Mosher, 1968; Pitkin, 1967). Kennedy (2013), 
for instance, illustrates that one does not have to be disabled 
to actively represent the interests of those who are, while 
O’Connor (2014) suggests that elite level bureaucrats may ac-
tively represent professional or technocratic ideas. More re-
cent work illustrates that active representation requires two 
critical conditions: i) critical mass and ii) issue of importance 
to the particular minority (for excellent overviews, see Lim, 
2006; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). 
professional competences, and legitimate their author-
ity on scientific aptitudes and capabilities (Haas, 1992; 
Rayner, 2003; Rutgers & Mentzel, 1999). As such, their 
involvement in the policy-making process would tend 
to come with a “promise [of] objectivity and transpar-
ency” (Rayner, 2003, p. 163). Still, as documented in a 
substantial philosophy of science literature discussing 
the ever closer connections between expertise and pol-
itics (e.g., Rutgers & Mentzel, 1999; Weingart, 1999), 
this is not always self-evident in practice. Experts may 
also contribute to a “mobilization of bias” in public pol-
icy-making (Schattschneider, 1975) because they may 
interpret relevant decision-making premises (data) dif-
ferently from elected office-holders (Sutcliffe & Weick, 
2008, p. 62) and thereby systematically induce active 
under-representation of certain information.  
Our empirical analysis concentrates on “external 
experts” in the European Commission (Commission)—
the so-called Seconded National Experts (SNEs). These 
are recruited from member-state administrations into 
the Commission on temporary contracts (maximum six 
years), and are specifically recruited to provide exper-
tise to the Commission in areas where this might be 
lacking in permanent staff. The data derive from Euro-
stat, official documents detailing the staff composition 
of the Commission, as well as a unique survey among 
Commission SNEs (N ≈ 450). We first of all employ 
these data to assess whether Commission SNEs reflect 
the characteristics of their constituent population (the 
EU-27 population); i.e., passive representation.3 This 
indicates that SNEs are not a close match to the com-
position of the EU-27 population in terms of gender, 
education, age and geographical origin. Still, one might 
wonder whether such passive (mis)representation real-
ly matters: i.e., does the demographic background of 
public officials affect their self-perception of being an 
“expert”? Our data suggests that it may not. Indeed, 
the active role perception of experts appears to be 
primarily explained by their organizational affiliation, 
and only secondarily by their demographic characteris-
tics. Only the educational background variable—among 
all demographic variables—has a substantive and sig-
nificant effect on active “expert” representation.  
In the next section, we briefly discuss the growing 
role of experts and expertise in public policy-making. 
Building on the foregoing RB literature, this section al-
so indicates how this tendency might affect bureau-
cratic representativeness. Then, in Section 3, we use a 
variety of datasets to unveil Commission SNEs’ repre-
sentativeness relative to the EU27-population. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes and discusses some avenues for 
further research. 
                                                          
3 Following the recent accession of Croatia, the EU mean-
while has 28 members. This had not yet occurred at the time 
of our data collection, such that we treat the EU-27 popula-
tion as the EU’s relevant constituent population.  
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2. Expertise in Politics  
2.1. A Note on Expertise  
Expertise is much more than the mechanical production 
of data and analysis. Expert knowledge grants access to 
constituting basic rules for cause and effect, distinguish-
ing right from wrong, categorising social phenomena 
and advising about good and bad. As a result, expertise 
has become an institution in itself, loaded with authority 
and power. Moreover, expert authority bestows its 
holder with legitimacy and a communicative platform 
that reaches far beyond the narrow scientific discipline. 
It is, however, not any kind of knowledge that func-
tions as the key to authority and power; only “recog-
nised knowledge” matters. Universities have tradition-
ally been the places with a monopoly on such 
recognised knowledge (Djelic, 2006; Drori & Meyer, 
2006; Drori, Meyer, Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003; Maasen 
& Olsen, 2007; Paradeise, Reale, Bleiklie, & Ferlie, 
2009; Ramirez, 2006; Savigny, 2013; Weingart, 1999). 
Today, political actors—public and private, national 
and international—seek to establish expert-based au-
thority founded on the idea of evidence-based rule-
making. Apart from seeking i) rational-legal authority 
based on the idea of impersonal rulemaking, or ii) del-
egated authority based on the idea of accountable 
rulemaking, or iii) moral authority based on the idea of 
normative or principled rulemaking, the role of 
knowledge thus seems to have become central in how 
political actors engage in processes of authority-
building and in how they go about legitimizing it (Bar-
nett & Finnemore, 2004; Maasen & Olsen, 2007).  
Expertise as the basis for authority was central to 
Max Weber, who considered rationalisation as one of 
the most important characteristics of the development 
of western society and capitalism (Wrong, 1970). Yet, 
almost paradoxically, “the increased use of scientific 
expertise by policy-makers has not increased the de-
gree of certainty, in fact it becomes de-legitimating” 
(Weingart, 1999, p. 151). The reason is that the in-
creasing use of expertise inflates the demand for such 
expertise, which drives the “recruitment of expertise 
far beyond the realm of consensual knowledge (…) to 
the research frontier where knowledge claims are un-
certain, contested and open to challenge” (Weingart, 
1999, p. 158). It might also push towards a “politicisa-
tion” of expertise, where the objectivity of the expert 
scientist is brought in doubt due to his/her involve-
ment in public policy controversies (Brooks, 1975). 
Nevertheless, purely epistemic communities, to the 
extent that they exist (Haas, 1992), in principle do not 
work under the shadow of politicians; they work under 
the shadow of the rules of the expert community. 
Members of an expert community are each other’s 
judges—accountability is turned inwards (Haas, 1990, 
1992). Public officials—such as Commission SNEs—who 
evoke an expert role are expected to enjoy behavioural 
discretion, and are influenced by external professional 
reference groups (Wilson, 1989). They are assumed to 
prepare dossiers, argue and negotiate on the basis of 
their professional competences and to legitimate their 
authority on scientific competences (Haas, 1992). Their 
behaviour is expected to be guided by considerations 
of scientific and professional correctness and the pow-
er of the better argument (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000). 
Their role perceptions and loyalties are primarily di-
rected towards their expertise and educational back-
ground as well as towards external professional net-
works. This is the “expert official” who perceives her-self 
to be an institutionally independent technocrat. She is 
driven by a so-called ”technical self-determination” 
(Pentland, 1973, p. 74). Moreover, bureaucratic organi-
zations infused with an epistemic logic are a challenge 
to institutional unity. Such institutions are character-
ized by being composed of loosely coupled experts 
with an “out-ward” orientation. Such organizations are 
typically porous and open, staffed by actors from dif-
ferent external expert institutions such as domestic 
agencies, universities, research institutions etc. (Olsen, 
2007; Trondal, 2013).  
2.2. Experts and Representative Bureaucracy  
The theory of RB assumes that the diversity and repre-
sentativeness of the public sector workforce impacts 
on how public sector organizations perform, how they 
are internally controlled, how legitimate they are per-
ceived to be, and how they relate to their constituent 
populations (Andrews,Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, Walker, 
2005; Selden, 1997; Schröter & von Maravić, 2014; Ste-
vens, 2009). This reflects the key notion that what civil 
servants bring with them into the organization is of 
significance to their conduct (Hooghe, 2005, 2012). 
From a normative viewpoint, this implies that “rep-
resentation and staffing carries important implications 
for the delivery of public services [and] the sharing of 
power in society” (Schröter & von Maravić, 2014, p. 6). 
That is, a more RB takes into account a wider variety of 
ideas and opinions in the society at large. RB has been 
linked to improved overall administrative performance 
(e.g., Kingsley, 2003), increased worker loyalty and job 
satisfaction (e.g., Choi, 2009) and higher legitimacy and 
accountability of the bureaucratic organization (e.g., 
Selden & Selden, 2001). RB has also been seen to play a 
symbolic role during the implementation of controver-
sial or unpopular policy programs (Peters, Schröter, & 
von Maravić, 2013; Pitts, Hicklin, Dawes, & Melton, 
2010) and with regards to opportunities and equity to 
public office (Gravier, 2013; Groeneveld & van de 
Walle, 2010; Peters et al., 2013).  
From a RB perspective, the increasing reliance on 
external expertise in public policy-making (see above) 
raises important questions about experts’ representa-
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tiveness. The reason is that such experts are generally 
appointed to provide a specific type of information or 
knowledge. This is particularly so among experts who 
have temporal appointments and who are recruited 
largely outside the standard recruitment procedures 
for permanent staff. Clearly, such recruitment flexibility 
may be employed—whether consciously or subcon-
sciously—to bolster staff contingents that are under-
represented in the permanent staff (or moderate staff 
contingents that are over-represented). If so, this may 
affect passive (or descriptive) representation within the 
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, when experts with (per-
ceived) unfavourable characteristics—or policy opin-
ions—become excluded, such recruitment flexibility 
may also induce a deterioration of the bureaucracy’s 
representativeness. The latter is not an unrealistic sce-
nario. Several observers indeed argue that it has “be-
come commonplace that the adversarial parties (…) 
engage scientific experts to present evidence which 
supports their respective views” (Weingart, 1999, p. 
156; see also Brooks, 1975).  
The above discussion naturally raises the second 
question whether individuals with higher expertise lev-
els are also more likely to perceive themselves as “in-
dependent experts” and act in accordance with the 
prescripts of such a role? According to the idea of indi-
vidual pre-socialization outside organizations, officials 
may be “pre-packed” already before entering the or-
ganization (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 277; Selden, 1997). Indi-
vidual pre-socialization outside organizations is im-
portant to account for, because most studies of elite 
socialization do not systematically control for the effect 
of pre-socialization and self-selection (Beyers, 2005, 
2010; Hooghe, 2005). This article uses the following 
demographic factors as proxies of individual pre-
socialization: age (in years), gender, educational back-
ground (fields of study, place of study, and level of 
graduation), and country of origin. Finally, seniority is 
applied as a control variable, such as to account for the 
idea that organizational re-socialization inside an or-
ganization may modify the effect of individual pre-
socialization outside the organization.  
First, on gender, studies suggest that female officials 
in the Commission have a somewhat different belief 
structure than male officials—for example with respect 
to their stronger general “supranational orientation” 
(Kassim et al., 2013, p. 111; Trondal, Murdoch, & Geys, 
2014). Our question is whether the gender of experts 
leads to different emphasis on their expert role. Next, 
previous studies show no age effect as regards Com-
mission officials’ general beliefs (Kassim et al., 2013). 
Thus, the age variable is applied in this study without 
any predefined prediction. Third, the educational back-
ground of office holders has shown a significant effect 
in previous studies. A first education-related prediction 
is that length of education might matter—measured by 
the highest attained degree. We expect that individuals 
with a doctorate have (much) stronger perceptions of 
being an expert compared to those without a doctor-
ate. Secondly, it may be expected that different fields 
of study vary in their influence on the strength of one’s 
self-perceptions of being an expert. Conceptualised as 
a continuum, “hard” and “soft” disciplines are indeed 
often characterised by degrees of paradigmatic status 
and consensus (Becher, 1989; Braxton & Hargens, 
1996; Smeby, 2000). Thus, officials with an educational 
background in “hard” sciences—such as physics, biolo-
gy—may see themselves more strongly as experts than 
officials educated in relatively “soft” sciences—such as 
social sciences. Finally, we might expect that place of 
study matters. One might indeed hypothesize that hav-
ing an international educational background may be 
conducive to evoking an expert role. The reason is that 
one’s education then is not tied to one particular envi-
ronment, but rather was obtained in a more diffuse ar-
ray of settings. This, in turn, may induce a focus on the 
content—or expertise—of the study.  
Finally, country of origin measures experts’ national 
pre-socialization. One might expect that experts origi-
nating from new and “un-socialized” member states give 
more priority to national concerns whereas the expert 
role has been more internalized among their colleagues 
from earlier accession countries. Experts originating 
from the old EU member states might thus be expected 
to have learned the “expert game” better than their col-
leagues from the new(er) member states, who are likely 
to be less pre-socialised into a “European state of mind” 
(dominant in the Commission’s DGs; Ban, 2013).  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Case Selection and Datasets 
Our empirical analysis of passive and active “expert” 
representation of Commission SNEs relies on a number 
of different data sources. First, to measure passive rep-
resentation we collected information about the charac-
teristics of the European population, since this is the 
most relevant comparison group to evaluate the repre-
sentativeness of European-level bureaucrats (Gravier, 
2008, 2013; Stevens, 2009). Information about the so-
cio-demographic characteristics (i.e., gender, age, edu-
cational background and nationality) of the population 
in the EU27 was obtained from Eurostat. Second, we 
collected information about the staff composition of 
the Commission. This is obtained from official publica-
tions of the Commission including, but not restricted 
to, the 2011 European Commission Human Resource 
Report, the Draft General Budget 2012 and online pub-
lications documenting the Distribution of Staff by Stat-
utory Links and DGs. (European Commission, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c).4  
                                                          
4 The year of analysis—2011—is determined by the year in 
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Secondly, to measure active “expert” representation 
we conducted a unique web-based survey administered 
between January and April 2011 to all 1098 then active 
SNEs in the Commission. This survey received 667 re-
sponses, which equals a response rate of just over 60 
percent. As not all SNEs answered all questions relevant 
to the present analysis, the final sample employed in the 
analysis hovers around 400 to 450 respondents. It is im-
portant to note that the distribution of the SNEs in our 
final survey sample across Directorate-Generals (DGs) 
compares to that observed for all Commission SNEs in 
2011. This similarity suggests that non-response within 
the targeted population was independent of the DG in 
which SNEs work, which improves the generalizability of 
the results reported below. 
3.2. Passive Representation 
Table 1 presents the composition in terms of gender, 
education, age and geographical origin of the European 
population (EU27), the Commission’s total staff, and 
Commission’s SNEs. While the first three socio-
demographic characteristics are commonly included in 
RB studies (Kennedy, 2014), the last characteristic (i.e., 
geographical origin) arguably becomes a more important 
dimension of representation for international bureau-
crats (Egeberg, 2006; Gravier, 2008, 2013; Trondal, Su-
varierol, & van den Berg, 2008). Table 1 documents geo-
graphical origin of officials by wave of enlargement 
(which reflects a country’s EU membership seniority): 
countries in the original EU6 (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany) vs. EU15 (EU6 
plus Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Austria, 
Ireland, United Kingdom and Greece). 
Looking first at standard demographic characteris-
tics generally included in RB studies, Table 1 indicates 
that the gender composition of the total Commission 
workforce (52% female) very closely resembles that of 
the overall European population (52% female). Women 
are, however, substantially under-represented among 
SNEs (40% female). The same is also true among the 
Commission’ permanent AD-level staff (40% female), 
which automatically implies that they are strongly 
over-represented in Assistant (AST) level positions that 
deal with assistant and secretarial tasks (65% female; 
not reported in Table 1). This gender division creates a 
significant potential for under-representation of female 
viewpoints in the Commission’s policy work and expert 
input. The age distribution of the Commission’s per-
manent staff witnesses an under-representation at 
both extremes of the age distribution, and is clustered 
strongly in the 40─60 age range (who is strongly over-
represented compared to the EU27-population). The 
age distribution among SNEs to some extent corrects 
                                                                                           
which our survey among the Commission’s SNEs took place 
(see below). 
for both deviations. Yet, this correction is imperfect as 
SNEs themselves at best approach the age distribution 
of the EU27-population.  
With respect to educational background, we natu-
rally observe a very strong over-representation among 
SNEs for variables reflecting specific forms of expertise 
(i.e., having studied outside one’s home country, or 
holding a doctorate). Just over 19% of all SNEs have 
completed at least part of their education outside their 
home country, and no less than 20% obtained a doc-
torate. The equivalent numbers in the EU27 population 
are 3% and 1%, respectively.5 Moreover, while social 
scientists (including economists and political scientists) 
are slightly over-represented relative to the share of 
tertiary graduates with such a degree in the European 
population, lawyers are over-represented within the 
Commission’s expert staff (16% versus 5% in the EU27). 
The latter may reflect that legal expertise is highly val-
ued for drafting official documents and delimiting dis-
cussions within the boundaries of EU law. 
Finally, compared to the share of the EU27-
population living in EU6 (47%) and EU15 (80%) coun-
tries, Commission’s permanent AD-level staff appears to 
face a slight over-representation of employees from the 
six “oldest” member states. The reverse conclusion 
holds among SNEs employed in the Commission, since 
the old(er) Member States are strongly under-
represented in this group. The latter suggests that the 
Commission is using such temporary positions to incor-
                                                          
5 Note that the EU27 figures exclude individuals studying in, 
for instance, the United States, Canada or Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, since intra-EU study-related travel is more 
common than extra-EU travel, this is unlikely to have a signif-
icant influence on our results. 
Table 1. Representation by gender, education, age and 
geographical origin (per cent). 
  EU27 All staff SNEs 
Women 52 52 40 
Social Science 28 a na 37 
Law 5 a na 16 
Study Abroad 3 b na 19 
PhD 1 c na 20 
19-40 years 44 32 41 
40-50 years 23 37 30 
50-60 years 21 27 18 
60-65 years 11 4 11 
EU6 47 51 30 
EU15 80 80 62 
Notes: a Share of tertiary graduates with a degree in a par-
ticular field of education; b Students studying in other EU27, 
EEA or candidate country, as percentage of total student 
population; c Estimate based on tertiary education graduates 
as percent of population in EU27 (23.7% in 2011) and the 
share of tertiary graduates finishing a doctorate (2.6% in 
2004); na is ‘not available’. Sources: Eurostat; OECD; Europe-
an Commission (2011a, 2011b, 2011c); Authors’ survey 
among Commission SNEs. 
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porate officials from countries that acceded to the EU in, 
or after, the 2004 accession round (see also Ban, 2013). 
Table 1 only looks at the Commission as a whole. Yet, 
the results thus obtained need not play out similarly 
across all different sections of this large and diverse bu-
reaucracy (Kennedy, 2012; Meier & Capers, 2013; Schrö-
ter & von Maravić, 2014). Research in organisation theo-
ry indeed indicates that decision-making logics vary 
substantially across policy areas (Egeberg, 2012a). With-
in the EU, for instance, it is easy to imagine that bureau-
crats have less leeway for personal initiative in sensitive 
policy areas (such as agriculture, regional policy, or de-
velopment aid) compared to less sensitive areas (such as 
research and innovation or mobility and transport). Dif-
ferent policy areas represented in the Commission may 
also foster different cultures of representation (Kenne-
dy, 2014), which can become reflected in the (interpre-
tation of) staffing policies (Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Gra-
vier, 2013; Murdoch & Geys, 2014). Consequently, and 
following recent suggestions to “bring institutional varie-
ty back into diversity research” (Schröter & von Maravić, 
2014, p. 4), Table 2 depicts the representativeness of 
SNEs across seven sets of DGs covering distinct policy 
areas (previously differentiated by Murdoch and Trondal 
(2013)).6  
As expected, the representation of different popu-
lation groups varies across policy areas. This holds first 
of all in terms of educational background: that is, we 
observe substantial over-representation of social scien-
tists in DGs occupied with External Relations and Re-
search, while lawyers cluster in Central DGs. SNEs with 
a doctorate are, unsurprisingly, strongly represented in 
Research DGs. The same can also be observed with re-
spect to SNEs’ age distribution (i.e., younger SNEs are 
over-represented in Market and Provision DGs, and old-
er SNEs in Supply and Provision DGs) and gender (i.e., 
while female SNEs face stronger under-representation in 
Market-, Supply-, and Research-related DGs, they are 
representative of the EU27-population in DGs linked to 
the Commission administration (“Central”)). Although 
the latter could in part reflect that these DGs provide 
more “female” occupations (as also observed via the 
higher share of women in “female” Assistant posi-
tions),7 it could also suggest that the administrative 
                                                          
6 We lack similarly differentiated data about Commission’s 
permanent staff, such that the analysis here necessarily relies 
on our sample of SNEs. The seven policy areas are “Market”, 
which is comprised of DGs COMP, ECFIN, ENTR and MARKT; 
“External Relations” is DGs ELARG, DEVCO, FPI, ECHO and 
TRADE; “Social Regulation” is DGs CLIMA, EAC, EMPL, ENV, 
SANCO, HOME and JUST; “Supply” is DGs ENER, CNECT, 
MOVE, RTD and TAXUD; “Provision” is DGs AGRI, MARE and 
REGIO; “Research” is DGs ESTAT and JRC; Central consists of 
BUDG, COMM, IAS, BEPA, SJ and OLAF (DG acronyms are ex-
plained in the appendix). 
7 Job typology may indeed give rise to “gendered” expecta-
tions concerning the performance, ability or “fit” of job can-
DGs in the Commission may have a stricter enforce-
ment of gender-equality standards. These DGs may be 
more directly involved in setting up and maintaining 
administrative procedures such as non-discriminatory 
hiring arrangements.  
3.3. Active Expert Representation: Does Background 
Matter? 
In this section, we turn to examining Commission SNEs’ 
role perception as an “expert”. The key question here 
is whether SNEs with higher expertise levels are also 
more likely to perceive themselves as independent ex-
perts in their day-to-day decision-making, and act in 
accordance with the prescripts of such an epistemic 
role. This is often expected from “administrators who 
perceive their role as that of an advocate or repre-
sentative of minority interests” (Selden, 1997, p. 140), 
but has not been directly tested for experts. It is im-
portant to observe here that we operationalize active 
“expert” representation by SNEs’ role perceptions (i.e., 
the extent to which they feel they perceive themselves 
as independent experts in their daily work) rather than 
actual policy decisions or outcomes. The reason behind 
this operationalization is that the discretionary power 
of bureaucrats is critical for active representation 
(Meier, 1993; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Final outputs, 
however, unlike personal decisions and individuals’ 
perceptions thereof, are often determined by numer-
ous factors beyond bureaucratic control (such as, for 
instance, citizen coproduction of public goods and ser-
vices; Whitaker, 1980; De Witte & Geys, 2011, 2013), 
which limits their relevance in measuring active repre-
sentation (Bradbury & Kellough, 2007). We thus study 
“the potential for active representation (…) rather than 
seeking evidence of policy outcomes in line with the in-
terests of specific groups” (Bradbury & Kellough, 2007, 
p. 698). The analysis relies on the following simple re-
gression model (with subscript i referring to SNEs): 
ExpertRolei =  + 1 Genderi + 2 Agei + 3 EduTypei + 
4 StudyAbroadi + 5 PhDi + 6 EU6i + 7 EU15i + 8 
SNEyeari+ i (1)        (1) (1) (1) 
Where “ExpertRole” is based on the question: “In your 
daily work, to what extent do you feel you act as an in-
dependent expert?”. It is coded using a six-point scale 
from “fully” (coded as 0) to “not at all” (coded as 5), 
which requires estimating an ordered logit model. We 
also cluster standard errors by either DG or country of 
                                                                                           
didates for specific jobs. This may lead recruiters to have a 
preference for women over men (and vice versa) for certain 
types of jobs (Heilman, 1995; Watts, 2009), but may also af-
fect applicants since gender stereotypes are known to have 
important self-fulfilling effects (Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; Mil-
ler & Turnbull, 1986). 
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origin to account for the fact that answers from SNEs 
within one DG (or from the same home country) may 
not be fully independent from one another. 
The key explanatory variables are SNEs’ age (in 
years), gender (1 if male), educational background 
(“EduType”; separate indicator variables for a degree in 
economics, political science or law), whether or not the 
SNE studied abroad (1 if yes) or obtained a doctorate (1 
if yes), and SNEs’ country of origin (separate indicator 
variables for EU6 and EU15). We also include the num-
ber of years (s)he has been working in the Commission, 
as exclusion of this variable may have a confounding 
effect of our estimate of the effect of SNEs’ age. SNEs’ 
seniority in the Commission is thus applied as a control 
variable, suggesting that organizational re-socialization 
inside the Commission to some extent may modify the 
effect of individual pre-socialization outside the Com-
mission. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 suggests that only the educational back-
ground variable has a significant effect on SNEs’ active 
representation as “experts”. First, we see that SNEs 
with a doctorate are much more likely to invoke their 
role as an independent expert. Thus, the length of pre-
socialization inside university organizations makes offi-
cials more expert-oriented. Secondly, SNEs with de-
grees in social sciences—such as economics and politi-
cal science—are significantly less likely to state that 
they act as an independent expert in their daily work in 
the Commission (compared to law and “other” de-
grees). This suggests that social science degrees lead to 
lower expert orientations, which might reflect the rela-
tive absence of uncontested scientific “laws” in such 
disciplines (as compared to law or “hard” sciences such 
as physics and engineering). Other demographic varia-
bles such as age, place of education and country of 
origin have no explanatory power. Finally, and support-
ing previous research, organizational re-socialization 
inside organizations affects the role perceptions of of-
fice holders (e.g., Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal, 2015) 
since we see that SNEs’ self-perception as “expert” 
tends to strengthen with the number of years in the 
Commission. Though not reported above, these results 
are robust to the inclusion of direct controls for work-
ing in specific DGs, which implies that individuals’ char-
acteristics are driving the above results rather than the 
DGs SNEs work in within the Commission (see above).  
4. Conclusion 
Not surprisingly, in terms of a number of basic socio-
demographic background characteristics, Commission 
SNEs can barely be called passively representative of 
the overall EU27-population. SNEs are significantly 
more likely to be male officials with a degree in law 
from the “new” member states that acceded in or after 
the 2004 accession round. The only exception is ex-
perts’ age, since the age distribution among Commis-
sion’s SNEs appears a substantially closer match to that 
of the EU27 population than the age distribution 
among Commission’s permanent AD-level staff. More 
importantly, however, this study suggests that only the 
educational background variable—among all demo-
graphic variables—has a significant effect on active ex-
pert representation. Organizational re-socialization in-
side organizations appears a stronger signifier of role 
perceptions—such as the expert role—among office 
holders (e.g., Egeberg, Gornitzka, & Trondal, 2014), 
since we see that SNEs’ self-perception as an inde-
pendent expert tends to strengthen with the number 
of years in the Commission. 
 
Table 2. Representativeness of Commission SNEs by policy area (N ≈ 452) (per cent). 
  EU27 
Market (N 
= 71) 
External 
Relations 
(N = 65) 
Social 
Regulation 
(N = 123) 
Supply (N 
= 87) 
Provision 
(N = 25) 
Research 
(N = 54) 
Central (N 
= 20) 
Women 52 38 46 46 34 39 31 50 
Social Science 28 a 48 51 30 26 32 50 35 
Law 5 a 20 11 21 16 4 0 35 
Study Abroad 3 b 20 23 19 14 28 15 25 
PhD 1 c 18 17 24 18 8 31 10 
19–40 years 44 56 35 40 33 52 35 45 
40–50 years 23 30 32 29 31 12 33 40 
50–60 years 21 7 22 20 21 20 20 10 
60–65 years 11 7 11 11 15 16 11 5 
EU6 47 38 28 25 32 16 33 40 
EU15 85 72 71 61 63 48 54 70 
Notes: a Share of tertiary graduates with a degree in a particular field of education; b Students studying in other EU27, EEA or candi-
date country, as percentage of total student population; c Estimate based on tertiary education graduates as percent of population in 
EU27 (23.7% in 2011) and the share of tertiary graduates finishing a doctorate (2.6% in 2004); ‘Market’ is DGs COMP, ECFIN, ENTR 
and MARKT; ‘External Relations’ is DGs ELARG, DEVCO, FPI, ECHO and TRADE; ‘Social Regulation’ is DGs CLIMA, EAC, EMPL, ENV, 
SANCO, HOME and JUST; ‘Supply’ is DGs ENER, CNECT, MOVE, RTD and TAXUD; ‘Provision’ is DGs AGRI, MARE and REGIO; ‘Research’ 
is DGs ESTAT and JRC; ‘Central’ consists of BUDG, COMM, IAS, BEPA, SJ and OLAF; Translation and administrative services are exclud-
ed. Source: Authors’ survey among Commission SNEs 
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Table 3. Estimation results. 
 ExpertRole (cluster 
by DG) 
ExpertRole  (clu-
ster by country)  
Male (dummy) –0.289 * (–1.83) –0.281 (–1.61) 
Age (years) 0.004 (0.43) 0.004 (0.53) 
PhD –0.628 ** 
 (–2.48) 
–0.641 ***  
(–3.50) 
StudyAbroad 0.201 (0.96) 0.227 (0.97) 
Economist 
(dummy) 
0.530 **  
(2.44) 
0.512 **  
(2.38) 
Political Science 
(dummy) 
0.490  
(1.46) 
0.475 *  
(1.89) 
Lawyer (dum-
my) 
0.173  
(0.60) 
0.158  
(0.72) 
EU6 (dummy) –0.002 (–0.01) –0.017 (–0.07) 
EU15 (dummy) –0.015 (–0.06) –0.018 (–0.06) 
SNE-year 2 
(dummy) 
0.275  
(0.80) 
0.280  
(0.91) 
SNE-year 3 
(dummy) 
–0.041  
(–0.14) 
–0.036  
(–0.14) 
SNE-year 4 
(dummy) 
–0.232  
(–0.80) 
–0.209  
(–0.64) 
SNE-year 5 
(dummy) 
–0.528 *  
(–1.89) 
–0.526 *  
(–1.93) 
Wald chi2 
N 
48.25 *** 
408 
68.78 ** 
409 
Note: t statistics based on standard errors corrected for clus-
tering at DG- or country-level between brackets, *** significant 
at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. The dependent variable uses the 
question: “In your daily work, to what extent do you feel you 
act as an independent expert?”, coded using a six-point scale 
from “fully” (coded as 0) to “not at all’ (coded as 5). 
The passive-active representation dichotomy re-
mains under-studied and contested, and deserves 
more in-depth analyses in future research. Future re-
search on RB should study in greater detail the condi-
tions under which passive representation translates in-
to (a potential for) active representation. Based on our 
findings, and in line with recent work on the European 
Parliament (Egeberg et al., 2014), pre-socialization out-
side organizations might be expected to matter less 
than organizational re-socialization inside organizations 
and organizational affiliation. That is, a study of Euro-
pean Parliament officials suggests that individual pro-
cesses of pre-socialization outside the EP reveal non-
significance. What matters is whether officials are em-
ployed by the EP secretariat or by the political groups 
(“organizational affiliation”) and their length of service 
in EU institutions (“organizational socialization”) (Eg-
eberg et al., 2014). Also, a review of the literature on 
the role of nationality in Commission decision-making 
concludes that Commission officials’ national back-
ground plays only a minor role. However, nationality 
matters somewhat more regarding commissioners’ be-
haviour, but makes up only one of several components 
of their highly compound role (Egeberg, 2012b).  
In particular, future research on active representa-
tion may consider how demographic variables matter 
under certain conditions: i.e., whether the organiza-
tional structure of a group is loose and supplies few 
relevant premises for behaviour; whether the actor 
participates in a fairly stable group with clearly stated 
goals; whether this group is perceived as important; 
whether membership is durable; whether the group 
and the values and identities it represents is generally 
accepted in society; whether there is a clear connec-
tion between what the group does and the life of the 
group members, and whether group belonging is con-
ceived and an important reason for recruitment to the 
group (Lægreid & Olsen, 1978, pp. 28-29). Future re-
search should thus examine whether expertise might 
affect decision-making behaviour (active expert repre-
sentation) under such conditions. 
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